As I’ve completed for the previous few years, I’m going to be grading every eradicated postseason supervisor on their decision-making. We spend the 12 months largely ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, as a result of to be trustworthy, they’re fairly small. Utilizing the flawed reliever within the eighth inning simply doesn’t really feel that unhealthy on June 22; there are such a lot of extra video games nonetheless coming, and the common season is extra about managing the grind than getting each doable edge on daily basis. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few video games to separate wheat from chaff, each final ounce of win chance issues, and managers make personnel choices accordingly. What higher time to grade them?

My objective is to judge every supervisor by way of course of, not outcomes. If you happen to usher in your finest pitcher to face their finest hitter in an enormous spot, that’s a great choice no matter final result. Strive a triple steal with the bases loaded solely to have the opposite workforce make 4 throwing errors to attain three runs? I’m in all probability going to name {that a} blunder though it labored out. Managers do loads of different issues — getting workforce buy-in for brand spanking new methods and unconventional bullpen utilization behind closed doorways is a talent I discover notably helpful — however as I’ve no perception into how that’s achieved or how every supervisor differs, I can’t precisely assign grades for it.

I’m additionally purposefully avoiding obscure qualitative considerations like “trusting your veterans as a result of they’ve been there earlier than.” Playoff protection lovingly focuses on clutch performs by confirmed performers, however Adolis García and Alek Thomas have been nice, too. Overlook trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your finest gamers. Corey Seager is vital as a result of he’s nice, not due to the variety of playoff sequence he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been round a very long time; once I’m evaluating choices, “however he’s a veteran” simply doesn’t enter my thought course of.

One word: Within the pitching part, I’m taking a extra particular have a look at reliever matchups. This 2022 Cameron Grove examine, which I’ve talked about in a number of prior report playing cards, measures a repeat-matchup reliever penalty. A forthcoming article, which I’ve reviewed, examines the problem with out specializing in particular matchups, however fairly taking a look at relievers pitching on back-to-back days or on quick relaxation after heavy workloads. Each of these items are, unsurprisingly, unhealthy for reliever efficiency. Managing the stability between starter and reliever over-work is admittedly onerous. I in all probability haven’t given sufficient credit score to the need of balancing bullpen workloads towards explicit opposing batters previously, however I’ll make an observation of it going ahead.

I’ve already coated the dropping managers of the Wild Card spherical and the numerous division sequence eliminations. Right now, it’s Dusty Baker’s flip.

Dusty Baker, Houston Astros
Batting: F
This part is often a blow-by-blow of pinch-hitting alternatives. We’ll get to that, at the very least the few instances that Houston used a pinch-hitter, however I’m going to inform you my complaints proper at the beginning: Martín Maldonado performed over Yainer Diaz a disturbing quantity of the time, and Chas McCormick bought shelved on the first signal of hazard. I’ve spun these two choices round in my head lots whereas penning this, and I can’t get behind both of them.

Maldonado is an terrible hitter. He’d inform you he’s an terrible hitter. He bats ninth; clearly, the Astros perceive he’s their worst hitter. Diaz made all of it the way in which to a 50/50 taking part in time break up by the tip of the 12 months, and the job ought to be his subsequent season. Within the playoffs, although, it was Maldonado who bought virtually all the taking part in time. To some extent, that’s simply Baker’s choice. However Maldonado was terrible this 12 months, even on protection. But he continued to play, and notably to hit whereas the Astros trailed. With the workforce down 5, he batted with a runner on base towards the Twins in Sport 2 of the ALDS. He led off three completely different innings of a decent 3-2 victory in Sport 4. You may’t cover unhealthy hitters; they simply hold batting and batting, one out of each 9 journeys to the plate.

That utilization continued into the ALCS. Going through a one-run deficit, Maldonado batted with the bases loaded in Sport 1. He struck out and the Astros by no means threatened once more. By the point Baker realized he wanted offense and subbed in Diaz, it was too late. Baker was higher in Sport 2, although Diaz didn’t reward his belief (he too struck out with the bases loaded). That appeared to calcify Baker’s choice making; he ran Maldonado out the remainder of the time and appeared reluctant to pinch-hit for him. Maldonado hit .143/.294/.143 the remainder of the way in which, however drew each single begin, and batted in key spots in Sport 7. I wasn’t even mad when Baker referred to as for sacrifice bunts from him – he’s only a unhealthy sufficient hitter that the maths works a number of the time. There’s not a lot level in having a dynamic rookie like Diaz (127 wRC+ this 12 months) should you’re going to staple him to the bench.

McCormick’s exile confuses me much more. He was a key cog within the offense all 12 months, whereas Mauricio Dubón was a pleasant utility piece. However by Sport 3 of the ALDS, Dubón was drawing the beginning in middle. Each of them are plus defenders, so I can perceive lineups like ALCS Sport 1, after they occupied left and middle towards a lefty starter. However McCormick on the bench in favor of Dubón towards a righty? That was just about customary by Sport 3 of the ALCS. Baker went even additional, transferring Dubón to the highest of the lineup towards lefties by Sport 5. He additionally pinch-hit for McCormick however not Dubón. In Sport 6, McCormick didn’t play in any respect, whereas Dubón batted 4 instances, all towards righties.

Taking part in the recent hand, you say? Only one downside – Dubon wasn’t that good within the postseason, hitting .320/.308/.320, the emptiest empty-average line possible. McCormick went .286/.355/.393, a meaningfully higher displaying, and in some way bought semi-benched for it. One in all a supervisor’s greatest jobs is to funnel at-bats to their finest hitters, and Baker failed to take action, as a substitute seemingly counting on hitters he trusts, no matter their manufacturing.

As for pinch-hitting choices, the Astros didn’t have many. They didn’t carry a lot of a bench, and since they had been pressured to maintain Diaz obtainable to pinch hit for Maldonado, that largely meant Michael Brantley on days the place the opposition began a lefty, and infrequently Jon Singleton. What’s that, you say? Shouldn’t McCormick be listed right here, since he bopped this 12 months and was getting benched with regularity? He in some way by no means pinch-hit this postseason. I’m as shocked as you might be. General, this was only a mess of a efficiency, and in some way the Astros ended up not taking part in two excellent hitters from their 2023 roster for enormous swaths of the playoffs.

Pitching: D+
The Astros don’t carry any lefty relievers, which really gave Baker enviable leeway in deciding pitching matchups. As a substitute of feeling boxed right into a selection – my lefty towards your lefty – Baker may combine and match as he selected relying on leverage and familiarity. That multiple-looks-at-the-same-reliever penalty I discussed is less complicated to mitigate when there aren’t any specialists, no pitchers put in your roster particularly to face a single hitter.

In opposition to the Twins, Baker didn’t have many choices to make. The offense staked Justin Verlander to an enormous lead in Sport 1, so he pitched a traditional workload – six innings and 93 pitches – earlier than departing for Hector Neris. Neris gave up a three-run homer to tighten issues up, however that was okay, as a result of Bryan Abreu and Ryan Pressly got here in to carry the road. In Sport 2, Baker may need let that laissez-faire perspective go too far. Framber Valdez got here out trying tough, surrendering three runs and loads of onerous contact within the first two innings. When the 9 and one hitters each reached to begin the highest of the fifth, it was in all probability time for him to go, however Baker caught with him towards an enormous stack of righties. Carlos Correa broke the sport open with a two-run single, and Valdez lastly hit the showers, however the harm was completed.

With a 5-0 lead in Sport 3, Baker let Cristian Javier pitch by a bases loaded jam within the fifth. I didn’t adore it, however at the very least the bullpen was prepared simply in case. He escaped, and the Astros cruised to victory, however given what number of relievers the Astros had stacked up, I assumed that sticking with Javier was at finest a barely suboptimal choice. Hunter Brown and J.P. France had been each prepared for prolonged aid appearances, and Javier had walked 5 batters.

Sport 4 confirmed that Baker would possibly simply habitually go away his starters in; José Urquidy was unhealthy within the common season and unhealthy within the playoffs this 12 months, and but he bought the highest of the order for a 3rd time in a two-run sport. Edouard Julien mashed a homer, Jorge Polanco hit a fly ball proper on the nostril for an out, and Baker lastly pulled Urquidy. To his credit score, Baker then adopted up together with his three most trusted relievers to shut out the sequence, however blended and matched properly sufficient that no pitcher confronted a single batter 3 times.

Verlander opened the ALCS with a masterful efficiency, however it wasn’t sufficient. He went 6.2 innings and solely allowed two runs, however he left with a 2-0 deficit and the Astros by no means managed to attain. On condition that, I don’t love utilizing Neris and Abreu to deal with the remainder of the innings; along with your workforce carrying a nine-man bullpen and never a lot leverage left within the sport, this may be a great spot for lesser relievers, notably within the first sport of a seven-game set. Neris, for instance, noticed Marcus Semien and Corey Seager 4 instances every this sequence and Mitch Garver 3 times. These had been the primary three batters he confronted on this sport. Abreu noticed Jonah Heim 5 instances and Evan Carter and Nathaniel Lowe 4 instances every; these are the three batters he confronted on this one.

Valdez continued to scuffle in Sport 2, giving up 5 runs by the primary batter of the third inning, and this time Baker pulled him earlier than Semien bought a 3rd have a look at him. He went to the low-leverage crew; Rafael Montero, France, and Phil Maton. They didn’t enable a run, whereas the Astros tacked on a number of to tighten issues up, which meant Baker once more summoned the massive canine: Abreu bought the eighth and Pressly the ninth. It was once more a low-leverage spot, and certainly the Astros didn’t rating sufficient runs to win, however I get why Baker did it. Taking place 2-0 within the sequence hurts. However since he’d already been utilizing his finest relievers in dropping conditions, he was piling on work and giving batters seems to be in additional plate appearances that didn’t actually matter.

In Sport 3, the Astros lastly jumped out to an early lead, and Baker once more let Javier run with it. He didn’t seem like his regular dominating self, with solely three strikeouts on the day, and Baker went to the previous “one baserunner and also you’re out” maneuver with a 5-2 lead within the sixth. Carter doubled with two outs, and identical to that, it was time for Neris, Abreu, and Pressly. I’m into it – I simply want that wasn’t the third straight sport the place Neris and Abreu had appeared, and the second straight for Pressly.

In Sport 4, shock! Urquidy didn’t have it, coughing up 5 hits and three earned runs (two of them by way of house runs) in two-plus innings. The Astros carried Brown and France (each of whom are higher than Urquidy and Javier in my thoughts, however look, that’s not what we’re litigating right here), so this wasn’t a catastrophe. Ryne Stanek got here in as a groundball specialist, Brown labored three scoreless innings, and the Astros scored sufficient runs to let the low-leverage ‘pen carry the day. This gave the high-leverage arms a much-needed break.

At this level, Baker was going through a troublesome optimization downside. He had three video games left, and Verlander would solely be beginning one among them. The remainder of his starters had been wherever between inconsistent and unhealthy within the playoffs, however he’d additionally used his high-leverage relievers quite a bit, which meant he wished to protect the bullpen as a lot as doable. On condition that context, I like his choice to have Verlander face the highest of the Texas order within the backside of the sixth inning. He merely needed to face a number of batters to make Houston’s plans work. He gave up a three-run homer to Adolis García – unhealthy luck, however what are you able to do – and departed when one other batter reached. That meant the Neris/Abreu/Pressly group got here out once more, once more with a two-run deficit. Pressly pitched quite a bit on this one because of Abreu’s ejection, however I feel this made sense: in a 2-2 sequence, you possibly can’t punt fairly so simply as you’ll in Sport 1.

By Sport 6, Baker may not deploy his go-to technique of utilizing his finest relievers even when the workforce was trailing by a number of runs. Down 3-1, and with Valdez having labored by 5 innings, he went to Maton. However when the Astros tightened the margin to 3-2, Baker pivoted to Neris and Abreu once more. Neither was notably good; they surrendered 4 baserunners and an earned run over two innings of labor. Down 4-2 heading into the ninth, Baker lastly waved the white flag – appropriately, in my view – and Montero and Stanek promptly gave up a five-spot to make the ultimate rating look lots worse than the sport felt.

That left solely Sport 7, however the pitching workers was actually gutted by this level. If you happen to’re making an attempt to get an concept of Baker’s circle of belief, it was principally simply Neris, Abreu, and Pressly. I’d throw in “whoever began at present’s sport,” however Javier bought shelled so rapidly (three runs from the primary six batters) that he didn’t final the primary inning. That meant two-inning stints for Brown and Urquidy, in addition to an tried lengthy stint from France, who gave up 4 earned runs in lower than an inning of labor.

I discovered it unusual that Baker buried Brown, a stable younger starter who had a foul two month stretch on the finish of the season, in favor of Javier and Urquidy. The latter hadn’t pitched a lot down the stretch, and he’d been fairly unhealthy when he did. Javier had a tough August and September himself. It looks as if Baker simply picked his veterans, a transfer I usually disagree with. These veterans pitched so poorly that I don’t understand how a lot managerial salvaging could possibly be completed right here, even when Baker had extra aggressively pulled them. It’s not like they put up a ton of innings even together with his persistence; non-Verlander starters mixed for a 9.00 ERA and averaged 3.1 innings per begin within the ALCS.

On the subject of managing the bullpen to maintain his finest pitchers a) contemporary and b) shielded from seeing the identical guys time and again, I don’t suppose Baker did notably properly. However I feel this job was lots tougher than his hitting choices. The best way that playoff baseball works today, you ultimately must lean in your mid-tier relievers. Possibly that’s in blowouts, perhaps it’s in spots the place they’re finest set as much as maximize their abilities, however there are simply too many outs to get with one or two ace beginning pitchers and three high relievers. Baker tried to stay with that previous plan, and when it failed, every thing fell aside.

That is reportedly Baker’s final 12 months managing the Astros, and if that’s the case, I’m unhappy to see it finish this fashion. Like most within the sport, I really like Dusty Baker, and I don’t know that he’s gotten sufficient credit score for adjusting to the sport’s present concepts round pitcher utilization. However the tough edges of his managerial fashion caught out extra this 12 months, and these playoffs had been a tough reminder of the previous.

In earlier playoff runs in Houston, that wasn’t the case. Baker appeared to handle by the trendy sabermetric ebook with only a few modifications, and did a very good job together with his pitching workers. However with a special and fewer analytically inclined entrance workplace in place, with extra tenured-but-fading veterans and extra younger gamers to juggle, among the previous tendencies got here out once more. It’s hardly the one motive the Astros misplaced – however it’s a great reminder that whereas loads of managing occurs behind the scenes, it’s nonetheless unhealthy to bury good hitters and lean on an rigid pitching plan.